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re the living will (LW) and
subsequent Patient SelfDetermination Act (PSDA) policy
failures? Should we admit this and move
on? That’s what Angela Fagerlin and Carl
Schneider conclude in a recent article in
the Hastings Center Report.1 For LWs to
function as hoped, the authors write,
people would have to have them, they
would have to decide and clearly state
what treatment they would want if
incapacitated, and the LW would have to
be available and understandable to people
making treatment decisions. Based on a
comprehensive review of hundreds of
studies of living wills, end-of-life decisionmaking, and the psychology of making
choices, Fagerlin and Schneider (F&S)
conclude that living wills don’t work and
should be abandoned in favor of durable
powers of attorney (DPOA) for health care.
Why do so few people have living wills?
On average, only about 20% of the U.S.
population has a LW. The low numbers
are a result of people procrastinating,
hesitating to plan for/talk about death, not
thinking a LW is needed, and prefering
family members and/or their physician to
make decisions for them. In addition, the
LW may be incompatible with certain
cultural traditions. F&S point out that
efforts to address each of these barriers
has not increased the number of persons
who have LWs. They ask, if “after so
much propaganda so few of us have LWs,
do we really want them, or are we just
saying what we think we ought to think
and what investigators want to hear?”
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The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter is a publication of
the Maryland Health Care Ethics
Committee Network, an initiative
of the University of Maryland
School of Law’s Law & Health
Care Program. The Newsletter
combines educational articles
with timely information about
bioethics activities in Maryland,
D.C., and Virginia. Each issue
includes a feature article, “Network News,” a Calendar of
upcoming events, and a case
presentation and commentary by
local experts in bioethics, law,
medicine, nursing and related
disciplines.
Diane E. Hoffmann, JD, MS
Editor

Can people really know what they will
want?
Research shows that most people can’t
accurately identify their future preferences—
they answer differently based on how a
treatment question is framed, change their
minds,2 and have trouble recognizing that
their views have changed. This makes it less
likely they’ll amend their LW and more likely
the LW will “treasonously misrepresent their
wishes.” This inability to clearly express
future treatment preferences is partly due
to health care providers’ poor performance in
effectively explaining key information. But
Cont. on page 2
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MARYLAND HEALTH
CARE ETHICS
COMMITTEE
NETWORK (MHECN)
On Thursday, May 27, MHECN and the
Greater Baltimore Medical Center (GBMC)
co-sponsored a Journal Club discussion
that focused on the Florida case of Terri
Schiavo. Schiavo, who is in a persistent
vegetative state (PVS), is the subject of a
lawsuit in which her parents are trying to
stop her husband, Michael, from
discontinuing Terri’s tube feedings. The
spirited discussion included debate about
the definition of persistent vegetative
state; the role of the courts and the
legislature in this type of case; challenges
to a health care surrogate’s stewardship;
and related issues. Many thanks to
GBMC for hosting this event! If your
institution is interested in hosting a
Journal Club discussion, please let us
know.
Don’t forget to register for MHECN’s
fall conference, “Still Hazy After All
These Years; The DNR Order: Problems &
Solutions,” to be held on Wednesday,
November 17, 2004, at Charlestown
Retirement Community in Catonsville, MD
(see Calendar).
MHECN welcomes Ellen Agler to its
Board. Ellen is the Director of Project
Management for Erickson Health Plan,
and brings to the Board a wealth of
experience in long-term care and assisted
living.
Ethics committee members and/or
employees of MHECN member
institutions who would like to receive
MHECN e-mail announcements directly,
please send us your email address and
the name of your institution, and we will
add you to our e-mail distribution list.
If you would like to join the MHECN email discussion listserv, you may do so
by sending a blank e-mail message to
join-mhecn@list.law.umaryland.edu.
Contact MHECN at (410) 706-4457; e-mail:
www.MHECN@law.umaryland.edu.
MHECN Coordinator: Anita J. Tarzian,
PhD, RN

THE METROPOLITAN
WASHINGTON
BIOETHICS NETWORK
The Metropolitan Washington Bioethics
Network continues to work with the D.C.
Superior Court Probate Division, which
has been sponsoring training sessions for
guardians on bioethics issues. The most
recent training was held on June 23 and
attended by more than 150 guardians.
Panelists included John Lynch, MD,
Andrea Sloan, Esq. , RN, Fiona Druy, RN,
NP, Michelle Grant-Ervin, MD, and
Barbara Soniat, PhD. Another session is
being planned for the fall (date TBA). In
addition, the DC Bar has established a
working group to attempt to update and
upgrade DC law on probate issues,
including guardianship, self-neglect and
related topics. MWBN continues to
extend ethics and health law resources to
its members. Joan Lewis, long-time
MWBN Coordinator, has recently moved
from the DC Hospital Association to
serve as Executive Director of IONA
Senior Services. She will continue to
serve as MWBN Coordinator from her
new post.
Contact: Joan Lewis, Executive Director,
202-895-9408, jlewis@iona.org.

The Living Will
Cont. from page 1

it’s also a psychological phenomenon—
people are poor predictors of their future
preferences. F&S conclude, “[G]iven this rich
stew of research on people’s missteps in
predicting their tastes generally, we should
expect misapprehensions about end-of-life
preferences. Indeed, those preferences
should be especially volatile, since people
lack experience deciding to die.”
Can people effectively articulate what
they want?
Even if patients knew what future care
they wanted, articulating it effectively in a
LW is exceptionally difficult. If the directive
Cont. on page 3

2 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

is too general (e.g., a ‘values history’), it
precludes drawing useful conclusions about
how to apply it to specific clinical scenarios.
If it’s too specific, it forces patients to
“address more questions than they could
comprehend.” Does a patient who forbids
use of feeding tubes in a LW mean in any
circumstance, or only if (s)he were
imminently dying? What is ‘imminent’? If
(s)he requests artificial feeding at the end of
life, does that person understand what this
might entail if (s)he were severely demented
and unable to meaningfully interact with
others?
Related to the problem of difficulty
articulating future preferences is the problem
of accurately interpreting the LW. One study
found no difference in agreement about the
patient’s treatment preferences between
surrogates and patients who had and who
had not completed LWs. This was true
even if surrogates had discussed the LW
with the patient just before being asked
their prediction of what the patient would
have wanted. Other studies have shown
that physicians are not helped by LWs in
determining the patient’s wishes. F&S assert
that the “failure to devise workable forms is
not a failure of effort or intelligence. It is a
consequence of attempting the impossible.”
Do living wills alter patient care?
LWs have not altered patient care,
research shows, whether evaluating
diagnostic testing, hospital and ICU
lengths of stay, or health care costs.
Patients have surrogate decision-makers
identified in the medical record who are not
who was appointed by their advance
directive (AD), and receive care that is
inconsistent with their LW. This may
partly be due to the LW not being where it
needs to be when it needs to be. In one
study, only 26% of hospital charts
accurately recorded information about
ADs, and only 16% of the charts contained
the form. In another, only 35% of nursing
home patients transferred to a hospital had
their LWs with them.
F&S present three reasons to explain
why LWs do such a poor job influencing
patient care. First, their content is vague
and difficult to apply in specific situations. F&S believe this exacerbates the
interpreter’s tendency to read the documents in light of his or her own preferences. Second, patients are not seen as
being hopelessly ill or actively dying, so

the LW is not invoked.3 Third, surrogate
decision-makers are often not available, or
are “ineffectual or [are] overwhelmed with
their own concerns and do not effectively
advocate for the patient.”
Do living wills have beneficial side effects?
Even if LWs don’t work as well as
intended, proponents argue that their
secondary benefits make them worthwhile.
These include: (1) stimulating conversation
between doctor and patient about end-oflife treatment; (2) reducing costs of
terminal illness (i.e., not having to
administer expensive therapies that would
otherwise have been administered if the
patient’s wishes to avoid them hadn’t been
known); and (3) bringing comfort to
patients and surrogates. Research findings
have challenged the first two,4 but Fagerlin
and Schneider cite some research to
support the third benefit (e.g., reduced
stress/unhappiness of family members who
authorized withdrawing a patient’s life
support in accordance with a patient’s
LW). However, because this comfort is
apparently unrelated to the accuracy of the
surrogate’s decision, F&S conclude that
“we are left with the irony that one of the
best arguments for a tool for enhancing
people’s autonomy is that it [the tool]
deceives them [the declarant] into
confidence.”
Repeal the PSDA and admit failure of the
LW?
F&S conclude:
LWs fail not for want of effort, or
education, or intelligence, or good
will, but because of stubborn traits
of human psychology and persistent
features of social organization ... If,
as we have argued, patients sign
LWs without adequate reflection,
lack necessary information, and
have fluctuating preferences
anyway, then LWs will not lead
surrogates to make the choices
patients would have wanted.
Citing the costs of implementing the
PSDA and the evidence that it has
“promoted the execution of uninformed
and under-informed advance directives,
and has undermined, not protected, selfdetermination,” they recommend
repealing it. In addition, they believe
patients should be told the truth—that

LWs have a “faint chance of achieving
their intended effect.” Patients who want
control over future medical decisions
should be counseled to appoint an agent
via a DPOA. Although these documents
are not perfect, the appointed agent
(likely to be a family member) will
“probably know more at the time a
decision needs to be made than patients
can know in advance.” Unlike LWs, the
authors concede that DPOAs are “simple,
direct, modest, straightforward, and
thrifty.”
NOTES
1. Fagerlin, R. & Schneider, C. (2004).
Enough. The failure of the living will.
Hastings Center Report, 34(2), 30-42.
Research studies referred to in this article are
referenced in Fagerlin & Schneider’s article.
2. A meta-analysis of 11 of 16 studies
regarding the stability of individuals’
preferences for life-sustaining treatment found
a stability of preference of 71%, on average
(range: 57-89%). F&S also cite a study that
found that “Only 10-14% of individuals who
survive a suicide attempt commit suicide
during the next 10 years, which suggests that a
desire to die is inherently changeable.”
3. For example, on the day before death, the
median prognosis for patients with heart
failure is 50% that they will live 6 more
months; these patients typically die quickly
from arrhythmia or infection. Patients with
heart failure who have advance directives
(LW or DPOA not specified) have not been
shown to be different in timing of DNR or
utilization patterns from those without.
4. Regarding the ability of the LW to stimulate
physician-patient communication about endof-life care, research shows that conversations
about LWs don’t take place often, and when
they do, are generally unsatisfactory.
“…[D]octors commonly ‘did not explore the
reasons for patient’s preferences and merely
determined whether they wanted specific
treatments’.” Physicians used vague language
to describe end-of-life scenarios, and
“conversations tended to ignore the more
common, less clear-cut predicaments
surrounding end-of-life care.” In a study
examining how doctors explain advance
directives, patients generally thought doctors
did a good job, but F&S conclude that it’s
“likely patients didn’t know how little they
were told.”
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The Living Will
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A challenge to
Fagerlin & Schneider
F&S concede that the minority of
individuals who have clear ideas of what
they want at the end of life and desire
control over future medical interventions
should still be able to complete a LW, but
F&S don’t think the LW, as policy,
should be promoted for the general
population. They present compelling
evidence that people poorly predict their
future preferences, which precludes
crafting LWs that achieve the intended
goal of directing future treatment.
However, LWs are only one form of
advance directive addressed by the
PSDA. Repealing the PSDA because of
recognized failings of the LW ignores the
alternative of shifting focus from
promoting LWs in their current form to
that of DPOAs, or to alternative advance
directives like the “Five Wishes” 1
document. However, promoting the
DPOA as an alternative to the LW
doesn’t solve the other problems F&S
elucidate, such as agents or surrogate
decision-makers not being available
(physically or emotionally) to advocate
for patients when needed, advance
directives being absent from patients’
medical charts, and health care providers
failing to effectively communicate with
patients and families about end-of-life
planning and treatment options.
Whatever takes the place of the LW will
inherit the same set of challenges: flawed
human psychology, prognostic
uncertainty, death aversion, faulty
communication/information exchange,
and institutional inefficiency. With this
list of barriers, it’s no surprise that
improvements are so incremental. But all
the more reason not to repeal legislative
incentives like the PSDA—instead, we
should more effectively implement the
law based on what we’ve learned thus far,
which is so aptly summarized by Fagerlin
& Schneider.
1. For more information about the “Five
Wishes” document, visit
www.agingwithdignity.org/5wishes.html.

Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Coordinator
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IMPROVING THE
CARE PLANNING
PROCESS: NEW
MARYLAND
LEGISLATION

M

rs. Jones is a nursing home
resident and has lost the
capacity to make medical
decisions, but has already expressed
her preferences about the use of lifesustaining medical treatments in a
living will. She used Maryland’s
optional form and directed that her life
“not be extended by life-sustaining
procedures” once she is in a terminal
condition. The living will is meant to
speak for her when she cannot.
But, once she is certified to be in a
terminal condition, the directions in the
living will must be transformed into
concrete, operational instructions for
those providing hands-on care: What
medications are to be given? Is a
feeding tube to be used if Mrs. Jones is
no longer able to eat normally? If she
has a cardiac arrest, is CPR to be
attempted? These and other matters
would be specified by her attending
physician in medical orders, which are
to be consistent with the living will.
Now suppose Mrs. Jones needs to
go to the hospital for some reason.
Maybe her living will would be sent
with her, and maybe not. Even if it
were, a new physician, who probably
doesn’t know Mrs. Jones, would have
to figure out how the living will should
affect the medical orders that the new
physician will write. The change in the
site of care increases the risk that Mrs.
Jones’ preferences will not be honored.
A variety of studies show a gap
between patients’ preferences about endof-life care and the interventions actually
performed in health care facilities.
Although many reasons for this disparity
have been identified, one has to do with
the problem of information flow across
care settings. A patient might move, for
instance, from an assisted living facility
to a nursing home, then to a hospital, then
to a rehabilitation facility, then back to a
nursing home. There is currently no
systematic way for a plan of care to be
established that honors the preferences

of the patient or the patient’s proxy and that
remains in effect, unless changes in the
patient’s condition require a modification,
no matter where the patient is receiving
care.
House Bill 556, which becomes effective
on October 1, 2004, addresses this problem
through an amendment to the Health Care
Decisions Act. A new section 5-608.1 of the
Health-General Article instructs the
Attorney General’s Office to develop a
document called a “Patient’s Plan of Care”
Form. In general, the “Patient’s Plan of
Care” Form will be a summary of the overall
plan of care, including the use of lifesustaining treatments, that has been decided
upon by, or on behalf of, a patient. Although
its use is voluntary, once the AG’s Office
has developed the new form after a public
consultation process, it can be expected to
gain increasing use over time in a range of
clinical settings.
The new form is intended to complement, not supplant, the decision-making
processes already recognized by the Health
Care Decisions Act. H.B. 556 recognizes
that patient or family decisions about the
goals of care are not self-executing. A
patient will receive care that fits these goals
only if health care providers actually know
about and follow a plan of care that is
consistent with the patient’s overall goals.
The “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form will be a
tool for embodying and communicating the
plan for each patient.
Relationship Between “Patient’s Plan of
Care” Form and Physician’s Orders
As introduced, H.B. 556 would have
enacted a “Physician Orders for LifeSustaining Treatment" (POLST) form, a
standard order form that health care
providers would have been required to
follow. Although this method has been
successfully used in a handful of other
states, opposition to the POLST
approach in a legislative committee
resulted in a significant set of
amendments. As amended, the bill does
not provide for any kind of physician’s
order. That is, a “Patient’s Plan of Care”
Form is not itself a physician’s order,
though ordinarily the contents of the
form will shape the orders to be written.
The bill contemplates a patientcentered process. First, the patient or the
patient’s proxy (health care agent or
surrogate) will have agreed to complete

the form, as attested by the appropriate
signatures. Once completed, the form
becomes the primary means of
communicating how the use of lifesustaining treatments fits within the
overall plan of care. Presumably, the
physician who signed the form will write
orders that reflect its contents.
The original “Patient’s Plan of Care”
Form, and the corresponding
physician’s orders, would remain in
effect until something significant
happened, as identified in the form itself
or as otherwise having obvious
potential impact on future clinical care.
Then, the attending physician should
revisit the plan of care with the patient
or proxy and, if appropriate, cause a new
“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form to be
completed and write new orders.
When a patient with a “Patient’s Plan
of Care” Form is transferred to a
different health care facility, the form is
to accompany the patient. When the
attending physician at the new facility is
considering orders for a patient with a
form, the physician is required to review
it. If, after reviewing the form in light of
the patient’s current clinical condition,
the physician concludes that the
patient’s condition has not changed in
any material way from when the plan
was formulated, the review should result
in clinical orders that are consistent with
the plan. If, however, the plan has been
overtaken by events and no longer
serves the patient’s best interest, the
new attending physician’s orders can
properly depart from the plan.
Relationship Between “Patient’s Plan
of Care” Form and Advance Directives
The “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form is
not a new type of advance directive.
Rather, it will serve as a bridge between
the decisions made in an advance
directive and treatment-specific medical
orders. Nothing in the bill changes the
current statutory right of an individual
to make a written or oral advance
directive. The making of an advance
directive means that the individual, in
anticipation of a future loss of capacity,
has decided about the use of lifesustaining medical procedures,
designated a health care agent, or both.
If a patient who has lost capacity has an
advance directive containing decisions,

like a living will, a “Patient’s Plan of Care”
Form for that patient must be consistent
with those decisions. Likewise, if an
individual had made an advance directive
naming a health care agent, a “Patient’s
Plan of Care” Form for that patient must
reflect the agent’s decisions.
Relationship Between “Patient’s Plan of
Care” Form and EMS/DNR Order
The “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form will
not substitute for an emergency medical
services “do not resuscitate order,”
anymore than an advance directive now
does. If a “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form
reflects the patient’s or proxy’s decision
that CPR not be attempted in the event of
cardiopulmonary arrest, the form would be
a basis for the patient’s attending
physician to write the appropriate order.
The form itself, however, is not such an
order and cannot directly affect the
actions taken by EMS personnel.
Nursing Home’s Obligation and the
“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form
The “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form is
expressly stated to be voluntary, and no
patient is ever required to have one.
Nursing homes, however, will be required
to offer new residents the opportunity to
prepare the form. If a resident is incapable
of making an informed decision, the
opportunity should be presented to
whoever is making health care decisions
on behalf of the resident. The exact
manner in which this opportunity is to be
presented is left to the reasonable
discretion of the facility administrator. A
nursing home’s failure to present this
opportunity, like other deprivations of
resident rights, could potentially lead to
sanctions through the licensing and
survey process.
“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form and
Statutory Immunity
Health care providers who will use the
“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form, including
physicians who write medical orders in
good-faith reliance on a “Patient’s Plan of
Care” Form, are protected in doing so by
the immunity provision in the Health Care
Decisions Act.

“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form and
Medically Ineffective Treatment
The “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form will not
be used to reflect the attending physician’s
judgment (with a consulting physician’s
concurrence) that a particular life-sustaining
treatment would be “medically ineffective,”
as that term is used in the Health Care
Decisions Act. The “Patient’s Plan of Care”
Form is a documentation of the care planning
decisions of the patient or the patient’s proxy,
based on the patient’s expressed wishes, the
proxy’s inference about the patient’s wishes,
or the patient’s best interest. The certification
that a treatment is medically ineffective is
based on none of these criteria, but rather
criteria of physiological ineffectiveness.
Consequently, a certification that a treatment
is medically ineffective is unrelated to the
“Patient’s Plan of Care” Form.
Conclusion
The care planning process has three
phases: the patient’s thinking about
health care issues and preferably
discussing them with family, friends, and
health care professionals; the patient’s
documenting his or her decisions in an
advance directive; and the health care
system’s provision of care that is
consistent with the patient’s advance
directive. When the patient has not
engaged in care planning, as the vast
majority have not, still some kind of care
planning by proxy ought to occur: the
proxy’s thinking about health care issues
in terms of what the patient would want
done or the patient’s best interests; and
the health care system’s provision of
care that is consistent with the proxy’s
goals for the patient. In either case, a
serious medical error occurs if the care
that is delivered is inconsistent with the
patient’s goals and values, as reflected in
the patient’s own words or the proxy’s
interpretation. The Maryland Legislature
and Attorney General’s Office hope this
type of medical error can be reduced if
health care providers make effective use
of the new “Patient’s Plan of Care” Form.
Jack Schwartz
Director of Health Policy
MD Office of the Attorney General
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OREGON PAS
SURVIVES
CHALLENGE
FROM ATTORNEY
GENERAL
ASHCROFT

I

n May of 2004, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
decided State of Oregon v. Ashcroft,
368 F. 3d 1118. In its ruling, the court
ordered the continuation of an injunction
that prevents federal enforcement of
Attorney General John Ashcroft’s
directive that criminalizes physicianassisted suicide in Oregon. The court
held that Ashcroft exceeded his authority
in trying to regulate physician-assisted
suicide, which is authorized in Oregon
under the state’s Death with Dignity Act.
The background of this case begins
with the passage of the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) in 1970. This
statute was enacted by Congress to
address the problems of drug abuse and
illegal drug trafficking in the United States.
The CSA provides regulations for
production and distribution of controlled
substances (i.e., drugs that have the
potential for abuse). The statute states
that “a prescription for a controlled
substance may be issued only for a
legitimate medical purpose by a
practitioner acting in the usual course of
his professional practice.”
In 1994, the State of Oregon enacted
the Death with Dignity Act (DDA),
becoming the only state to legalize
physician-assisted suicide. Under the
DDA, adult Oregon residents suffering
from an incurable disease likely to result
in death, are eligible to receive
prescribed medication that would end
life. A physician may prescribe, but not
administer, the medication to the patient.
Since its enactment, approximately 70
terminally ill patients have taken their
lives following the stipulations of the
DDA. In all cases, patients used
medications listed as controlled
substances under the CSA.
Beginning in 1997, several attempts
were made by certain legislators to
interpret the CSA in a way that would
make it illegal to prescribe controlled
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

substances for the purpose of assisting
with suicide. Janet Reno, Attorney
General from 1993 – 2001, reviewed the
issue and concluded that the federal
government did not have the authority to
prosecute Oregon physicians who were
in full compliance with the DDA,
although they were prescribing
controlled substances for the purpose of
assisting with suicide. She explained that
“the CSA was not intended to displace
the states as the primary regulators of the
medical profession, or to override a
state’s determination as to what
constitutes legitimate medical practice.”
In November 2001, after John Ashcroft
became Attorney General, he issued a
statement (known as the “Ashcroft
directive”) specifically addressing
physicians in Oregon acting under the
Death with Dignity Act. The directive
states that assisting with suicide is not a
legitimate medical purpose, and that
prescribing, dispensing, or administering a
controlled substance for the purpose of
assisting with suicide is not in the public
interest. Any physician assisting with
suicide under the DDA would be in
violation of the CSA and could face
criminal prosecution and termination of
their ability to prescribe a controlled
substance.
In response to the Ashcroft directive,
the State of Oregon, along with an Oregon
physician, pharmacist, and several
terminally ill patients, filed a lawsuit against
the Attorney General to prevent
enforcement or application of the directive.
A temporary restraining order, preventing
implementation of the directive, was
granted by a U.S. District Court Judge
Robert Jones (District Court of Oregon.)
The Judge ruled that the CSA was not
intended to overrule a state’s decision on
what constitutes “legitimate medical
practice” and found that the Attorney
General and the DEA went beyond their
authority in trying to control state
physicians acting under the DDA.
The case was appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for a
final decision. The Court held that the
Ashcroft directive interferes with Oregon’s
authority to regulate medical care within its
borders, which is an area traditionally
reserved for state authority. In addition,
the Court of Appeals determined that the
Ashcroft directive conflicts with the CSA,
which addresses problems associated with
drug abuse and addiction—not

medications prescribed by physicians to
assist with suicide.
The ruling of the Ninth Circuit supports
state regulation of medical practice. The
decision in this case will be significant for
any other states that seek to address the
issue of physician-assisted suicide and
other issues related to the administration
of controlled substances.
Iyanrick John, MPH
University of Maryland
School of Law, ‘06

‘DEADLY MEDICINE’
– HOLOCAUST
MUSEUM EXHIBIT
OPEN THROUGH
OCTOBER 16, 2005
“It is a rare and special good
fortune for a theoretical science to
flourish at a time when the
prevailing ideology welcomes it,
and its findings can immediately
serve the policy of the state.”
Eugen Fischer, leader of the
German eugenics movement, 1943
“It is certainly not the fault of
eugenics, if godless and criminal
misuse occurred in National
Socialism without any knowledge
of the genetic facts, and through
the destruction of all human
dignity.”
Eugen Fischer, 1955

T

he new Holocaust Memorial
Museum exhibition “Deadly
Medicine: Creating the Master
Race,” chillingly chronicles the use and
abuse of science in the name of Nazism.
This exhibit demonstrates how scientists
and physicians crossed the fine line
between objectively generating data and
contributing to torture and murder in the
name of science and ‘social policy.’ The
museum’s director, Sara J. Bloomfield,
says in the catalogue to the exhibition,
“[d]uring the Holocaust, every
institution established to uphold

civilized values failed—the academy, the
media, the judiciary, law enforcement,
the churches, the government and, yes,
the medical and scientific disciplines as
well.”1 While the tendency is to distance
oneself from Nazi ideology, the exhibit
reminds attendees that the ‘Final
Solution’ was arrived at through a series
of small steps. Most people recognize
the horror of the gas chambers and
inhumane Nazi experiments. Fewer dwell
on the more subtle moral thresholds that
were crossed en route. For example,
American eugenics (which were
endorsed up until the 1960’s) inspired
Adolf Hitler, who praised them in ‘Mein
Kampf’ and skillfully promoted eugenics
policies in Nazi propaganda films and
movies. Nazi eugenics led German
citizens, scientists, and physicians to
see the logic and compassion of
euthanasia as a humane response to
ending the suffering of individuals
deemed as having a ‘life not worth
living.’ Our modern-day aversion to
health care rationing may stem from
early eugenics policies, which were
commonly concerned with the social
cost of illness (for example, a wall
display by the American Eugenics
Society in the 1920’s reads, “”Every 15
seconds $100 of your money goes for
the care of persons with bad heredity”).
These everyday health and social
concerns were the starting point for
well-intentioned German scientists and
physicians. This exhibit demonstrates
how their moral compasses became
frighteningly misdirected, and offers
lessons to others who think they’re not
apt to lose their moral bearings.
The U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum is open 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
every day except Christmas and Yom
Kippur. Admittance is free and no
passes are required for the “Deadly
Medicine” exhibition. The museum is
at 100 Raoul Wallenberg Place SW,
near the Smithsonian Metro stop. The
exhibition runs through Oct. 16, 2005.

NOTE
1. As cited in “The Seduction of
Science: To Perfect an Imperfect Race”
by Philip Kennicott, The Washington
Post, Thursday, April 22, 2004; Page
C01.

THE POPE AND
ARTIFICIAL
NUTRITION

O

n several occasions over the last
50 years, representatives of the
Catholic church have explicitly
stated that withdrawing life support,
including artificial nutrition and hydration
(ANH), is permissible “if it does not offer
hope of benefit or imposes an excessive
burden.” These statements were made by
Pope Pius XII in 1957, the Catholic
Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith in 1980, and Pope John Paul II in
1995. Determinations of “hope of benefit”
were to be made by the patient or the
patient’s proxy, and could be applied to
persons in persistent vegetative states
(PVS). Until recently, this view has been
supported by Catholic bishops, conferences
of bishops, and Catholic medical ethicists.
However, contrary opinions were expressed
at the March 2004 international congress,
“Life-Sustaining Treatments and the
Vegetative State: Scientific Advances and
Ethical Dilemmas,” sponsored by the World
Federation of Catholic Medical Associations
and the Pontifical Academy for Life, and
attended in Rome by 350 physicians and
medical ethicists. During this meeting,
Pope John Paul II asserted that the
administration of ANH is “a natural means
of preserving life, not a medical act,”
particularly for patients in a PVS.1 Bishop
Elio Sgreccia, vice president of the Pontifical
Academy for Life, avowed that artificial
hydration and nutrition for patients in a PVS
is “simply care,” and not medical
intervention. And Eugene Diamond, director
of the Catholic Medical Association’s
Linacre Institute, said that the provision of
nutrition and hydration through tubes was
not an “extraordinary” intervention but
obligatory care.2
James Walter, professor of bioethics at
Loyola Marymount University in Los
Angeles, reacted by countering, “We
normally understand ‘care’ to mean
washing the patient’s body, turning the
patient so they don’t get [bedsores],
things of that sort, and you could include
providing a tray of food to a patient …
But when you start artificially delivering
this, it is now a matter of treatment."3
Walter pointed to inconsistencies in the
current “Ethical and Religious Directives

for Catholic Health Care Services.” The
introduction to Part 5 says ANH can be
discontinued if the patient is imminently
dying or if the patient cannot assimilate
the nutrition and hydration, while Article
58 says there’s a presumption favoring
providing ANH, but that ANH can be
withdrawn if there’s not sufficient benefit
to outweigh the burdens to the patient.
Walter believes that the Schiavo case in
Florida has triggered this latest
examination of ANH in Catholic doctrine.
Indeed, the Pope voiced concerns
about respect for patients in PVS that
likely reflect the attitudes underlying
Catholic conservatives’ changing views
toward ANH. For example, the Pope
stated, “[B]eing in the presence of a
living person already imposes the
obligation of full respect and of
abstaining from any act that aims at
anticipating the person’s death.” The
Pope has also recently stated, “[d]eath
by starvation or dehydration is, in fact,
the only possible outcome as a result of
… withdrawal [of ANH]. In this sense it
ends up becoming, if done knowingly
and willingly, true and proper euthanasia
by omission.” Dominican Fr. Kevin
O’Rourke, professor at the Neiswanger
Institute of Ethics and Public Policy and
the Stritch School of Medicine at Loyola
University, Chicago disagreeing with this
view, clarified that those who believe
ANH for PVS patients is a medical
treatment and offers no hope of benefit
or that it imposes an excessive burden
still view the PVS patient as a person, but
one for whom there is no moral mandate
to prolong life.
Part of this debate centers on
interpretation of Catholic moral tradition
determining whether an intervention is
ordinary or extraordinary. Shannon and
Walter4 refer to the “proportionatedisproportionate means test,” described
in the 1980 Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith’s “Declaration on
Euthanasia,” stating, “In any case, it will
be possible to make a correct judgment
as to the means by studying the type of
treatment to be used, its degree of
complexity or risk, its cost and the
possibilities of using it, and comparing
these elements with the result that can be
expected, taking into account the state of
the sick person and his or her physical
and moral resources” (paragraph 4).
Examples are given, including “when
Cont. on page 8
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The Pope and Artificial Nutrition
cont. from p. 7
inevitable death is imminent in spite of
the means used, it is permitted in
conscience to make the decision to
refuse forms of treatment that would
only secure a precarious and
burdensome prolongation of life, so long
as the normal care due to the sick person
in similar cases is not interrupted.”
Shannon and Walter point out that
ordinary and extraordinary forms of
treatment are determined by their effects
on the patient or on those who have the
responsibility to care for the patient,
which requires knowledge of a specific
patient and his or her own wishes.
Furthermore, they counter the charge
that surrogates acting according to a
family member’s wish to forego ANH
(e.g., communicated through an advance
directive) are not attempting to end the
patient’s life because the patient is a
burden to them. Shannon and Walter
express concern that the Pope’s recent
statements represent “an elevation of
biological or physical life to an almost
absolute value,” which is counter to
other declarations, such as in the
encyclical Evangelium Vitae, in which the
Pope states, “Certainly the life of the
body in its earthly state is not an
absolute good for the believer, especially
as he may be asked to give up his life for
a greater good.”
Shannon and Walter ask several
questions: What is the level of
magisterial authority with which the
Pope’s statement about ANH is made?
Does it apply only to patients in a PVS,
or does it also extend to other categories
of patients who need permanent feeding
tubes inserted but are not in a PVS? If
not the latter, then on what grounds do
we argue that it is always required of
patients in a PVS?
It has yet to be seen how this issue
will unfold within the Catholic church,
and how Catholic health care facilities,
providers, patients, and families will
respond to these recent Vatican
statements. There have been ample
statements from U.S. bishops countering
the Vatican’s views.
Brian Yanofchick, a local senior vice
president of Bon Secours Health
System’s three Virginia hospitals, says
the Pope’s statements (which did not
8 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

mention living wills but have implications
for honoring living wills) have prompted
questions, but no immediate changes at
Bon Secours hospitals.5 For now,
Yanofchick says they will continue to
honor living wills as written by patients.
But he expects much more discussion
before resolving the debate stirred by
John Paul II, explaining, “In the Catholic
world, when the Pope says something,
that’s the beginning, not the end.”
NOTES
1. Yet later, the Pope stated that use of ANH
must be considered “ordinary and
proportionate,” which made some wonder
whether he considered ANH a type of
treatment (though an “ordinary and morally
required one”).
2. “Extraordinary” refers to interventions
that do not offer hope of benefit or that
impose an excessive burden, while
“ordinary” refers to interventions that offer
some hope of benefit and no excessive burden
(i.e., ‘care’).
3. U.S. ethicists counter Vatican view;
artificial hydration, feeding: normal or
extraordinary care? Arthur Jones, National
Catholic Reporter, March 26, 2004. http://
ncronline.org/mainpage/
healthbeatarchives.htm.
4. Artificial nutrition, hydration: Assessing
papal statement. Thomas A. Shannon, James
J. Walter, National Catholic Reporter, April
16, 2004. http://ncronline.org/mainpage/
healthbeatarchives.htm.
5. Three local hospitals weigh Pope’s words
on feeding tubes. Steven Vegh, The VirginianPilot, May 4, 2004. http://
home.hamptonroads.com/stories/
story.cfm?story=69859&ran=193307.

CASE
PRESENTATION

O

ne of the regular features of
the Newsletter is the
presentation of a case considered
by an ethics committee and an
analysis of the ethical issues
involved. Individuals are both
encouraged to comment on the
case or analysis and to submit
other cases that their ethics
committee has dealt with. In all
cases, identifying information
about patients and others in the
case should only be provided with
the permission of the individual.
Unless otherwise indicated, our
policy is not to identify the
submitter or institution. Cases and
comments should be sent to:
Diane E. Hoffmann, Editor, MidAtlantic Ethics Committee
Newsletter, University of
Maryland School of Law, 500 W.
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD
21201, or
dhoffman@law.umaryland.edu.

CASE STUDY FROM
A MARYLAND
LONG-TERM CARE
FACILITY

M

r. Silvers is a 66-year-old male
with a diagnosis of a
meningioma, which has required
surgery and radiation to his brain.
Although meningiomas are benign brain
tumors, due to the location and size of Mr.
Silvers’ tumor, it compresses on various
parts of the brain adjacent to it. Mr.
Silvers underwent surgery in 1989 and the
meningioma was partially removed. More
extensive removal could not be done due
to its location. Radiation treatments to
shrink the tumor caused ‘panhypopituitarism’ (lack of pituitary hormone production), and subsequently requires Mr.
Silvers to take cortisone pills, without
which he would die. He also began to

develop some cognitive deficits after
these treatments. This slowly worsened,
and in 1999 he developed normal
pressure hydrocephalus, or excessive
buildup of fluid in the brain. This
required the placement of a shunt to
alleviate the pressure and allow the fluid
to drain. Since then his cognitive and
physical abilities have continued to
decline, due to a combination of the
tumor pushing on the surrounding brain
tissue, the post-radiation effects and the
hydrocephalus. In March of 2003, he had
deteriorated to the point that he required
twenty-four hour care for all his needs, at
which time he was admitted to a longterm care facility. A few months later he
developed pneumonia and respiratory
failure. He was hospitalized, and placed
on a ventilator for a short period of time.
After hospitalization he was discharged
back to the nursing home and enrolled in
hospice. He could no longer swallow
well and his caretakers believed he would
die from the respiratory infection. He
survived this, however, and slowly
began to recover and eat. His cognitive
function deteriorated to the point that he
had only brief periods of lucidity; his
thoughts were generally scattered. He
was no longer able to walk. He needed to
be fed. He recognized his wife, but not
his child.
His wife of over forty years had cared
for him at home for as long as she could.
Mr. Silvers had no living will or advance
directive. Mrs. Silvers is her husband’s
agent (as designated in his power of
attorney for financial matters) but not his
appointed health care agent. Once Mr.
Silvers was enrolled in hospice, Mrs.
Silvers was comfortable with the decision
to no longer treat his future infections,
such as pneumonia, with antibiotics, or to
hospitalize him if he had a major change in
condition. She based her decisions on
what she felt he would want. Since Mr.
Silvers stabilized and no longer appeared
to be actively dying, it became very hard
for her to see him in this state of total
dependency. He had traveled all over the
world as a consultant, was highly
educated, and his hobbies were all in the
intellectual realm. It was disheartening for
his wife to see her once articulate and
passionate husband reduced to complete
dependence for daily functions. He could
no longer read or participate in
discussions. Mrs. Silvers wanted to

explore the possibility of stopping all his
current medications. What was the point
of prolonging his life, she wondered, when
it had none of the qualities her husband
had cherished? She felt he had lost all his
dignity. The issue of stopping his
medication was discussed, specifically
his hormone replacement.
Due to his adrenal insufficiency, he
could not survive without the cortisone
pills as replacement hormones. Mr.
Silvers’ physician, however, feared that
stopping the cortisone would cause Mr.
Silvers to experience pain or discomfort
(for example, nausea, vomiting,
abdominal cramps, or severe
hypotension). If steroids were to be
avoided, even for palliative reasons, his
physician wondered if palliative sedation
would be necessary to control Mr.
Silvers’ symptoms. The physician asks,
is it ethical to choose a course of
treatment that might require palliative
sedation as an option? Does Mrs. Silvers
have the right to decide that the
cortisone be discontinued?

COMMENTS FROM
A PALLIATIVE CARE
NURSE ETHICIST

T

he physician in this interesting
case asks two questions. The first
is whether it is ethically
appropriate to choose a course of
treatment that will probably cause such
painful symptoms that palliative sedation
will be required. The second is whether
the wife of this decisionally incapacitated
patient has the “right” to request that the
cortisone pills, necessary for his survival,
be stopped. Although it is not clear
whether the physician is referring to a
legal or a moral “right,” the second
question ought to be addressed first
because, if Mrs. Silvers has no legal right
to speak for her husband, it could be
argued that the physician has no
obligation to consider her request.
Despite the fact that Mr. Silvers did not
complete an advance directive prior to
losing decisional capacity, the Maryland
Health Care Decisions Act (HCDA)
recognizes the spouse as a legally
appropriate surrogate decision-maker if
the incapacitated patient meets one of

three qualifying conditions: is terminally
ill, is in a persistent vegetative state, or
has an end-stage condition. According to
the HCDA, a patient is terminally ill if
death is ‘imminent’ from an incurable
condition. The fact that Mr. Silvers’ brain
tumor continues to grow, his condition is
incurable, and he was deemed hospiceeligible, provides support for a prognosis
consistent with being terminally ill,
although his recent rally, stabilization, and
improved ability to eat suggest a less
predictable dying process (assuming he
continued receiving the cortisone).
Nevertheless, his condition meets the
HCDA-definition of being ‘end-stage’
(“an advanced, progressive, irreversible
condition caused by injury, disease, or
illness: (1) that has caused severe and
permanent deterioration indicated by
incompetency and complete physical
dependency; and (2) for which, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty,
treatment of the irreversible condition
would be medically ineffective”). Thus,
Mr. Silvers’ wife should be legally
recognized as his surrogate for health care
decision-making.
If we agree that Mrs. Silvers has the
legal right to make treatment decisions
for her husband, the next question to ask
is whether she has the moral right to
make this particular request - that the
cortisone pills be discontinued. We
might ask whether there are decisionmaking standards that would preclude or
limit the kinds of decisions that
surrogates can make. This might be what
concerns the physician in the first
question – should Mrs. Silvers be
permitted to choose an action (e.g.,
request the withdrawal of the cortisone
pills, a life-sustaining treatment) when as
a consequence, Mr. Silvers might
experience such distressing symptoms
that palliative sedation would be
necessary to control those symptoms.
There are two well-recognized
standards for surrogate decision-making,
“substituted judgment” and “best
interests.” Both standards focus on the
patient. Respect for personal autonomy
is the basis for the substituted judgment
standard, which requires the surrogate to
decide as the patient would if he or she
were capable. When the patient’s
treatment wishes are unknown, the
surrogate is expected to make treatment
Cont. on page 10
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Case Study
Cont. from p. 9
choices that promote the patient’s overall
well being, and choose the treatment that
furthers his or her best interests. In this
case, Mr. Silvers’ wife of over 40 years is
well placed to answer the question, “What
would Mr. Silvers choose if he could
speak to us now?” She asks, what is the
point of prolonging her husband’s life
when it has none of the qualities he has
cherished? One could also ask, what is
the point of providing interventions that
serve only to prolong his dying?
Surrogate decision makers have a well
recognized legal and ethical right to decide
to withhold or withdraw medical treatment,
whether or not it is life-sustaining, as long
as the decision is consistent with the
patient’s personal wishes, life values, or
beliefs. Similarly, hospice and palliative
care clinicians have an obligation to
effectively manage the symptoms
experienced by their dying patients,
whatever the cause of those symptoms.
Just as palliative care clinicians would
manage any distressing symptoms caused
by the forgoing of other life-sustaining
treatments like nutrition and hydration
when such decisions are made by
competent patients, so should the
physician in this case be prepared to use
palliative sedation in the event that Mr.
Silvers experiences intractable symptoms
caused by stopping the cortisone pills.
Doing so demonstrates respect for Mr.
Silvers and his previously held values and
beliefs, as articulated by his surrogate –
who knows well that he would not want to
continue living in his current state. If Mrs.
Silvers requested withdrawing the
cortisone pills but refused interventions to
palliate any subsequent pain or discomfort
her husband might experience, this case
would take a different turn. But with the
facts presented here, there is no reason to
question Mrs. Silvers’ stewardship as
surrogate decision-maker for her husband.

COMMENTS FROM
A PALLIATIVE CARE
PHYSICIAN

T

he case of Mr. Silvers reminds us
that “benign” is a treacherous
term indeed. Although Mr.
Silvers’ brain tumor (a clivus
meningioma?) may be benign by
histology, his clinical course is anything
but. Treatment of Mr. Silvers’ brain tumor
has extended his life but at an ironic cost:
progressive neurological deterioration and
ever diminishing capacity. In this way, his
condition is analogous to that caused by
other progressive neurological diseases
like Alzheimer’s Dementia, Parkinson’s
Disease, and Huntington’s Chorea. The
common thread to all of these diseases is
the gradual, continual loss of neurological
function that leads to a decreased ability
to coordinate one’s movements, to
respond meaningfully to others and the
environment, and to make one’s wishes
known. Death results from complications
of the patient’s diminished mental and
physical capacity. Unable to effectively
fight infection or to swallow properly to
avoid aspiration, the patient may die from
subsequent pneumonia or other infections
to which the neurologically impaired are
susceptible. If we recall the mortality of
end-stage neurological degeneration, i.e.,
that of the bedfast, immobile, nearly nonverbal, totally dependent patient, Mr.
Silvers is likely to die within six months,
irrespective of corticosteroid replacement
therapy. Indeed, he meets the Medicare
Hospice Benefit eligibility criteria.
At issue is Mrs. Silvers’ right to stop all
life-prolonging measures, including Mr.
Silvers’ cortisone medication. Although
not her husband’s legally appointed
health-care agent, she is recognized in law
by the Maryland Health Care Decisions
Act as a surrogate decision-maker and is
presumed, by ethical tradition, to be the
person who best knows his wishes. Mrs.
Silvers essentially believes that her
Judith Kennedy Schwarz, RN, PhD
husband would prefer to die rather than
Consultant, Ethics and End of Life Care
continue his present diminished existence.
New York, NY
While physicians are barred from actively
and intentionally causing a patient’s
death, discontinuing unwanted medical
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treatment has a solid legal and ethical
foundation. Viewed in this way, Mr.
Silvers’ case is little different from
withdrawing unwanted dialysis in a
patient with end-stage renal disease, or
withdrawing unwanted mechanical
ventilation from those irretrievably
ventilator dependent.
Such actions are sometimes justified
using the “doctrine of double effect”
(DDE), in which a negative effect (death)
is ethically allowed as long as it is
unintended and unavoidable in achieving
the good effect (relieving pain or
suffering). In this case, however, the DDE
is of limited value: death for Mr. Silvers is,
if not a prima facie good, then the lesser
evil when compared to the alternative:
continuing a slow decline from his present
diminished state. The fact that stopping it
may actually cause pain or discomfort
does not categorically bar the action nor
does potential for discomfort make the
action clinically unique—many medical
interventions cause discomfort. Side
effects of medical therapies or their
withdrawal can, and should, be managed.
Mr. Silvers’ physician is obligated to
palliate any symptoms that may develop
after stopping the cortisone. Sedation is
not an uncommon side effect of palliative
medications. Sometimes pain and symptom
management can be achieved while
minimizing sedative effects. Other times
sedation is unavoidable but acceptable to
the patient and/or family members as a
“least bad” alternative to conscious
suffering. Mr. Silvers’ physician should
do what is necessary to make Mr. Silvers
comfortable through his dying process,
including allowing sedation —whether as
an unintended side effect or as a tool for
palliation.
Charles M. Harrison, MD
Vice President for Medical Services
Montgomery Hospice, Inc.
Rockville, MD
______________________________________
We welcome comments to this case study,
including how cases such as this are
handled at your institution. Please e-mail
your comments to
MHECN@law.umaryland.edu.

CALENDAR OF EVENTS
SEPTEMBER*
9-10

The President’s Council on Bioethics Meeting, Washington, D.C. Contact: http://www.bioethics.gov/meetings/.

23

Portrayals of Physicians in Art and Literature: From Hippocrates to the House of God, Rhonda L. Soricelli, MD, The University
of Maryland Medical Systems’ Medical Humanities Hour, UMMC Shock Trauma Auditorium, 4PM. Contact:
hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu.

23-24

African American Perspectives in Bioethics, Georgetown University Medical Center, Research Building Auditorium. Contact:
http://clinicalbioethics.georgetown.edu/calendar/index.html.

30 –
Oct. 2

Creating Pathways For Care at the End of Life, 19th Management and Leadership Conference, Washington, DC, USA.
Sponsored by the National Hospice & Palliative Care Organization. Contact: http://www.nhpco.org/MLC2004.

OCTOBER*
1

Futile Care: When & How Can Healthcare Providers Say ‘No,’ sponsored by Sentara Center for Healthcare Ethics, Norfolk, VA.
Contact: jmwest@sentara.com or (757) 668-4263.

5

“I’m demented and I want to vote,” addressing the ethical, legal and social issues raised by voting by persons with dementia.
Speaker Jason Karlawish, MD. The Emanuel & Robert Hart Lecture Series, sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania Center
for Bioethics, 3401 Market St., Ste. 320, Philadelphia, PA. (12N-1PM). Contact: 215-898-7136 or visit: http://
www.bioethics.upenn.edu.

14

Talking to Patients/Surrogates about Dying: Clinical Approaches, Ethical Obligations, and Maryland State Law. Evan DeRenzo,
PhD, Steve Selinger, MD, and Jack Schwartz, JD. The University of Maryland Medical Systems’ Medical Humanities Hour,
UMMC Shock Trauma Auditorium, 4PM. Contact: hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu.

14-16

Humanity, Technology, and Perinatology: Good Ethics Based on Good Information. A conference on perinatal ethics, including
palliative care, pain and symptom management. Sponsored by the National Perinatal Association. La Jolla Marriott Hotel, San
Diego, CA. Contact: Anita Catlin, catlin@sonoma.edu, or visit http://www.nationalperinatal.org .

17-20

Spotlight on Quality, Focus on Residents, sponsored by Last Acts and the National Citizens’ Coalition for Nursing Home Reform
(NCCNHR), Hilton, Crystal City, Arlington, VA. Contact: Jennifer Hirsch, 202-332-2275, jhirsch@nccnhr.org, or visit http://
www.lastacts.org.

22

WV Center for End-of-Life Care Bi-Annual Summit - Ethical and Legal Issues in Respecting Patients’ Choices at the End of Life.
Speakers include Jack Schwartz, JD, Maryland Attorney General’s Office, and Bud Hammes, PhD, Gundersen Lutheran Medical
Center. Marriott Charleston Town Center, Charleston, West Virginia. Contact: Cindy at 877-209-8086.

28-31

6th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, Marriott Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA. Contact:
http://asbh.confex.com/asbh/2004/.

NOVEMBER*
10

Georgetown Fall Bioethics Colloquium, Sponsored by the Center for Clinical Bioethics, Warwick Evans Conference Room,
Building D at Georgetown University. (4:30PM). Contact: Marti Patchell, 202-687-1671.

17

Speaker Dominick L. Frosch, PhD, Robert Wood Johnson Health and Society Scholar, University of Pennsylvania (topic TBA),
The Emanuel & Robert Hart Lecture Series, sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics, 3401 Market St.,
Ste. 320, Philadelphia, PA. (12N-1PM). Contact: 215-898-7136 or visit: http://www.bioethics.upenn.edu

18

Medicine in an Unjust World: Neglect of Easily Preventable Diseases as an Abuse of Human Rights. David Hilfiker, MD. The Dr.
and Mrs. Howard B. Mays Lectureship in the History of Medicine and Ethics. University of Maryland Medical Center, Shock
Trauma Auditorium, 4PM. Contact: hsilverm@medicine.umaryland.edu.

*

The 7th Annual Lecture Series in Palliative Care begins September 27th, and is held every Monday and Thursday until
November 4 at Johns Hopkins Hospital, Hurd Hall, 5-6PM. Visit www.hopkinscme.net for a list of topics and CME
registration information.
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